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Abstract
This paper examines the importance of indirect network eﬀects in the U.S. video game market be-
tween 1994 and 2002. The diﬀusion of game systems is analyzed by the interaction between console
adoption decisions and software supply decisions. Estimation results suggest that introductory pricing is
an eﬀective practice at the beginning of the product cycle, and expanding software variety becomes more
eﬀective later. The paper also ﬁnds a degree of inertia in the software market that does not exist in the
hardware market. This observation implies that software providers continue to exploit the installed base
of hardware users after hardware demand has slowed.
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1 Introduction
Many high-tech products exhibit network eﬀects, wherein the value of the product to an individual increases
with the total number of users. Often these eﬀects operate indirectly, through the market for a complementary
good. For example, the value of a CD player depends on the variety of CDs available, and this variety
increases as the total number of owners of CD players increases. Other examples include DVD players and
discs and computer hardware and software. In this paper, we estimate indirect network eﬀects in the market
for video game systems. A system consists of a video game console (hardware) and game titles (software).
The console itself does not have any value apart from facilitating the use of software. Other factors such as
console price and quality being equal, a consumer would prefer to buy the console that oﬀers a wider variety
in game titles.
Understanding indirect network eﬀects is crucial for understanding why products like these succeed or fail.
Moreover, since high-tech products tend to have short product cycles, it is also important to understand how
the implications of indirect network eﬀects diﬀer over the course of the product cycle. Penetration pricing
is often mentioned as a useful strategy in these kinds of markets.
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By oﬀering a low introductory price, a
ﬁrm selling hardware can build up an installed base of consumers, which will lead to more software provision
and a higher willingness to pay for hardware later in the cycle. It is also regarded as crucial for platform
providers to have a broad selection of software available in order to promote console sales and raise royalty
revenues.
The purpose of this paper is to measure the eﬀects of software variety and hardware price throughout
the evolution of a network industry. The modern U.S. video game market provides an ideal opportunity
to study this issue for two reasons: (a) the presence of indirect network eﬀect is apparent; (b) because of
the short product cycle and intense inter- and intra-generational rivalry, we observe multiple incompatible
console systems in the market, providing us with suﬃcient data variation for analysis. To investigate the
eﬀectiveness of the business strategies, we must investigate the causal relationship between the hardware
installed base and software title variety. Both the installed base and software variety are, in the end,
endogenously determined as market outcomes. In order to address the endogeneity problem, we explicitly
characterize the indirect network eﬀect as an interaction between console purchases made by consumers and
software supply chosen by game providers.
To date, there has been only a handful of empirical papers studying indirect network eﬀects. Among
them, some estimate network eﬀects only from the installed base of consumers. These include Bayus and
Shankar (2003), Ohashi (2003), and Park (2002). These papers essentially model indirect network eﬀects
as though they were direct–i.e., consumers beneﬁt directly from the existence of other consumers,
2
rather
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See, for example, Shapiro and Varian (1999).
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The direct network eﬀect model is most appropriate for something like a telephone network. As more consumers use
telephones, the value of the telephone to an individual consumer increases because it is possible to call more people. It is as if
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than indirectly through the market for a complementary good. The work deals explicitly with such markets
includes Gandal, Kende, and Rob (2000), which focuses on the compact disc player market in order to explain
the diﬀusion process of a single technology with network eﬀects; Dranove and Gandal (2003), which estimates
indirect network eﬀects of DVD and Divx players; and Nair et al (2004) on personal digital assistants (PDA’s).
These papers analyze a one-shot standards war, not a situation like ours in which technologies are evolving
and one standard is dominant for some period of time but is eventually overtaken by a superior standard.
This unique feature of the video game market helps us look at the evolution of console market shares and
software availability for multiple technologies. Following an approach of Nair et al (2004), our empirical
model draws extensively from the results of the theoretical work of Church and Gandal (1992; 1993) and
the extension in Park (2002). Our paper contains three diﬀerences from Nair et al (2004) in identiﬁcation
strategy. The ﬁrst diﬀerence is due to the nature of the market under study. While Nair et al (2004) analyzes
the developing phase of the product cycle, our study period covers both developing and declining stages of
consoles. Thus we need to account for this nonlinearity of product evolution. The second diﬀerence is that
we do not use observed product characteristics as instruments to control for unobserved characteristics. In
the video game market, the assumption may not hold in that observed characteristics may be positively
correlated with brand image or other attributes for which we do not have data. The last diﬀerence is that
we create cost-side instruments by using the fact that U.S. game consoles are the same as Japanese consoles.
These instruments are similar to those proposed by Hausman (1996), but likely to be free from a criticism
of Bresnahan (1996).
We ﬁnd that lowering price is particularly eﬀective near the beginning of the product cycle: Demand
for hardware is particularly elastic with respect to price at the beginning of the cycle.
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Furthermore, we
ﬁnd that the elasticity of demand for hardware with respect to the available variety of software is relatively
low at the beginning, and higher in the middle of the product cycle. Thus, while it is generally regarded as
crucial to have some software available in order to launch hardware successfully, we ﬁnd that on the margin
an additional title does not have nearly as much eﬀect on hardware demand at the beginning of the cycle as
it does later. At the end of the cycle, when a hardware standard is becoming out-of-date relative to newer
competitors, the elasticity of hardware demand with respect to both price and software variety is low.
We also uncover a degree of inertia in the software market that does not exist in the hardware market.
As a console becomes obsolete, both the installed base and software variety decrease. By characterizing
the hardware and software decisions explicitly, we obtain an additional insight that growth of the hardware
installed base diminishes ﬁrst, and software provision slows down only after a lag. This ﬁnding implies that
software providers continue to exploit the installed base of consumers after hardware demand has slowed.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes important features of the U.S. video
the quality of the telephone is increasing in the number of consumers.
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Even if hardware is priced most aggressively near its introduction, the price may be highest then because the marginal
production cost is much higher than later in the product cycle.
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game market and gives descriptive statistics from our data set. Section 3 presents the model used to
analyze the indirect network eﬀect. The model characterizes two economic activities in the U.S. video game
market: hardware adoption and software provision. Section 4 describes the data and instruments used in
the estimation. In the construction of the instruments, we use the fact that all the game systems in the
data were manufactured in Japan during the period. Section 5 discusses the estimation results. Using these
results, Section 6 describes the role of indirect network eﬀects in the platform competition in the period from
1994 to 2002. Section 7 concludes. A technical appendix follows.
2 The modern U.S. video game market
The U.S. market for home video game systems has grown enormously in recent years. In the period of our
study, console sales more than doubled, from 6 million units in 1994 to 13.1 million in 2001. Total revenues
for the industry were $9.4 billion in 2001, larger than total box-oﬃce revenues in the movie industry ($8.4
billion in 2001).
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Table 1 shows market structure in the U.S. video game market during the period from
1994 to 2002 (because of data availability, the last year of our sample includes data only for the ﬁrst quarter
of the year. We discuss the data sources in Section 4.1).
A video game system consists of hardware (the video game console) and software (game titles). Games
are produced on cartridges or discs for use with the console. Hardware ﬁrms (like Nintendo) design and
manufacture hardware and charge licensing fees to ﬁrms producing software; we will also refer to hardware
ﬁrms as platform providers. Hardware producers generally produce some of their own software, and many
independent ﬁrms produce software for one or more consoles. For the leading consoles, the vast majority of
titles are produced by independent software publishers.
In Table 1, we present eight major game systems in order of the total units sold in the sample of over
seven years. Figure 1 is a simple way to verify the presence of indirect network eﬀects. The ﬁgure plots
yearly pairs of installed base and software variety for ﬁve major consoles in the period from 1994 to 2002.
Installed base is represented as the number of cumulative console units sold up to a given time, and software
variety is the number of game titles that receive sales in the market. In any given year, we calculate a share
by console type for each of the variables. Generally, the size of the installed base of hardware users and the
amount of software variety available are positively correlated for any given technology. As a console increases
in popularity, both variables increase; as a console becomes out-of-date and is overtaken by competition,
both variables decrease.
The signiﬁcant market growth in the U.S. video game market was accompanied by considerable upgrading
of console quality, leading to a rapid turnover of systems. At the broadest level, three technical factors
determine the quality of the systems as presented in Table 1: instruction word length (in bits) of either the
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“Recession? Don’t Tell the Video Game Industry,” New York Times, May 24, 2002.
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central processor (CPU) or graphics processor (GPU), clock speed (in MHz), and the amount of RAM (in
mega bytes). The instruction word length is a measure of the maximum complexity of any single command
sent to the processor, clock speed measures the number of such instructions that can be processed per second,
and RAM provides temporary storage of information as a game is being played. The earliest machine in our
sample was the Nintendo Entertainment System (NES), introduced in January 1986. The NES was an 8-bit
console that ran at 4 MHz and had up to 8 kilobytes of RAM. The technical limitations of early systems
restricted on-screen objects to two dimensions with a narrow range of colors. These technical characteristics
were upgraded considerably in later consoles: Comparison of the NES console with the Sony PlayStation 2
(PS2), introduced in October 2002, tells us that instruction word length increased by 16 times; clock speed
by 164 times; and lastly, RAM increased by 16,000 times! The latest game systems can create more realistic
sounds and improved graphics with faster and more complicated play.
Since the late 1980s, game makers have introduced new game systems approximately every ﬁve years
to satisfy the needs of consumers who look for more powerful games to play. The considerable quality
upgrading leads to frequent console turnover, along with signiﬁcant market growth. Table 1 indicates that
market growth was also stimulated by aggressive pricing by console providers: For the ﬁrst three years of
the console introductions, the average price cut was about 28.4% per year, whereas the price drop for older
consoles was modest at 7.5%. The console prices in general continued to drop even into the period when the
consoles sales were in decline. The estimation of console demand must take account of this rise and fall of
popularity in the console lifecycle.
For any given year in the sample period, there have generally been two dominant consoles and a few fringe
players. At the beginning of the sample period, the Sega Genesis and the Super Nintendo Entertainment
System (SNES) dominated the console market (see units market share in Table 1). They were quickly
replaced by the Sony PlayStation (PS) and Nintendo N64. By the end of the sample period, PS2 sales were
growing fast (to date, the PS2 is the leading console and has sold approximately 60 million units worldwide
5
). All the game systems in Table 1 were originally developed in Japan
6
and sometimes sold under diﬀerent
names there.
7
We use this fact to construct instruments to control for endogeneity of some variables in
Section 4.2.
Table 1 also presents information on the software market. The third row for each platform (% software
variety) indicates the share in terms of the number of game titles sold by year. The total number of game
titles is provided at the bottom row in the table. Software publishers provide ﬁnance for game development,
manage relations with hardware providers, and perform packaging and marketing for game titles. Marketing
5
“Playing Mogul,” New York Times, December 21, 2003.
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During our sample period, American-made consoles were not strong competitors. The 3DO system, introduced in 1993,
never captured more than 2% of the market. Microsoft’s Xbox was introduced in November 2001 and was not well established
by the end of the sample period.
7
For those systems that have diﬀerent names, we list Japanese names as follows with corresponding English names in
parenthesis: Nintendo Famicon (NES); Super Famicon (SNES); and Sega Mega-Drive (Genesis).
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of game titles entails extensive advertising and promotion at trade shows, such as the Consumer Electronic
Show and the Electronic Entertainment Expo. A software publisher may either develop games in-house or
subcontract game development to independent developers. Platform providers also publish some software
titles themselves, but these “ﬁrst-party” titles comprise a modest share of the software variety available for
their own consoles (see %variety oﬀered by platform provider in the table). A simple calculation from Table
1 shows that the software share provided by platform providers starts with an average of 27.7% in the year
of a console’s introduction, immediately declines to 21.5% in the following year, but hits another high of
26.6% six years after the console release. From this point, the share declines. Some titles are available on
multiple platforms; however, this is true for only 17% of the titles in our sample. Converting a game from
one system to another has required additional development time and cost, and contractual agreements with
platform providers sometimes require exclusivity to one game system.
An independent publisher pays a royalty fee to a platform provider for every unit of a game title sold.
Software licensing fees are the primary source of revenue for hardware producers. Although data on hardware
cost are not available, it is widely speculated that all of the major consoles have been sold at a price near
marginal cost. According to Brandenburger (1995), there is good reason why it is in the interest of a hardware
provider to keep the price of the hardware itself low and proﬁt through software sales instead.
8
When deciding
whether to buy a console, consumers face uncertainty about the quality of the game experience they will be
getting and about future software prices. A low hardware price signals the platform provider’s conﬁdence
that the consumer will want to buy games. There is also a holdup problem: Once a consumer buys a console,
he is captive to that platform to some extent and can be induced to pay a lot for games. Knowing this,
consumers are willing to pay less for the hardware. Although we do not explicitly model uncertainty, our
estimation results are consistent with the theoretical predictions described above. The results discussed in
Section 5 imply that lowering hardware prices is eﬀective, especially early in the product cycle.
3 A model of indirect network eﬀects
This section describes the estimation model we use to analyze indirect network eﬀects in the U.S. video
game market in the period from 1994 to 2002. Based on the descriptive statistics illustrated in Figure 1, this
section seeks to establish the causal relationship between the hardware and software markets. The model
comprises two main components, hardware adoption and software provision, and the indirect network eﬀect
is characterized by the interaction of these two components. We use a canonical model often used in the
8
The story of the 3DO Multiplayer reinforces this view. The company owned the rights to the most technologically advanced
console on the market at the time. However, any ﬁrm could produce a Multiplayer. As with other platforms, software producers
had to pay a royalty to 3DO. This royalty was unusually low ($3 per unit, as compared to approximately 5 times this for SNES).
The hope was that the low royalties would foster a large variety of software, and that consumers would buy the console because
of this. However, since hardware producers could not subsidize hardware production with proﬁts from software royalties, the
price of the hardware was high (two to three times the price of other consoles on the market at the same time). Even though
the quality of the console was undisputed, consumers were unwilling to pay the high price of hardware.
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literature to describe the hardware and software markets. Our empirical model of indirect network eﬀects is
similar to that of Nair et al (2004), and thus we refer the mathematical derivation of our model to Nair et al
(2004) and the unpublished appendix (available from the authors). We ﬁrst describe hardware adoption and
then turn to an empirical model of software entry. Section 4 addresses the endogeneity issue and introduces
instruments used in the estimation. Section 5 discusses the estimation results for the model presented in
this section.
3.1 Hardware adoption
Following the theoretical work on indirect network eﬀects including Church and Gandal (1992; 1993) and
Chou and Shy (1990), our model is based on consumer preferences for hardware and software. As discussed
above, a video game system consists of a console technology and compatible game titles. Since a console itself
has no stand-alone beneﬁt, a consumer who purchases a console must purchase game software written for
that system. We capture this aspect of preferences by using a symmetric constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) utility function. This speciﬁcation assumes that a consumer values all available game titles equally.
Though tractable, this speciﬁcation is not entirely consistent with the U.S. video game market. According
to Coughlan (2001), only a handful of game titles shared a majority of the industry revenues: The top ﬁve
percent of the titles made more than 50 percent of the software industry revenue in our sample period.
Furthermore, more than 50 percent of the revenues for a particular game title were typically made in the
ﬁrst year after the game release. It is, however, diﬃcult to extend this CES speciﬁcation to incorporate
heterogeneity of game titles. We instead use a measure of heterogeneity in game titles as an instrument to
achieve identiﬁcation in Section 4. Hardware adoption in our model is thus assumed to depend only on the
number of game titles provided (where the quality of each title is assumed to be the average quality of all
titles), the price of games, and the price and other characteristics of consoles. Since we do not intend to
make contributions to the theoretical work on indirect network eﬀects, but rather are interested in testing
an implication of the model often used in the literature, we leave the derivation of the underlying model
setup to the unpublished appendix.
We use the television household as the purchasing entity, where each household has a unit demand for a
video game system.
9
Video games are normally played by individuals whose ages range from 10 to 30 years
old. Demographic data are, however, not available in our data set. Using an implication of the theoretical
9
In this paper, we use data for console games only, and all consoles require the use of a television as a monitor for game
play. There is also a signiﬁcant market for video games that can be played on a personal computer. However, this is commonly
regarded as a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent market by those in the industry, since console games are generally played in the living
room rather than at a desk and thus are more likely to be regarded as entertainment. Certain genres of games, most notably
educational, are more popular in the PC format than any console format. Also, because there are no security measures built
into PC hardware, piracy is more of a problem for PC games than for console games. The number of titles available in the
PC format at any given time has generally been large, but the total sales volume is relatively small (less than 30% of the total
market in 2001) and declining. It would be very diﬃcult to incorporate PC data because of the inherent problems in tracking
PC sales and imputing some percentage of PC use to game play.
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result, we assume that a representative household maximizes the following utility function at time t by
choosing console j among J
t
+1 alternatives, one of which is the option of not purchasing a console:
u
jt
= β
0
+ x
j
β
x
+ β
p
p
jt
+ ωh (N
gt
) + ξ
jt
+ ε
jt
, (1)
where u
jt
is a representative household’s utility from consuming console j that belongs to format g. Generally,
g and j are the same. We use diﬀerent indices to account for the backward compatibility of the PS2. Since
the PS2 can be used to play PS games, but not vice versa, the PS2 format includes both the PS and PS2
consoles, whereas the PS format includes only the PS console. Let p
jt
be the price of console j at time t
(adjusted by the CPI), and β
0
contains a constant term and other control dummies discussed in Sections 4
and 5.
We have data on three observed characteristics in Table 1: data width, clock speed and RAM, and denote
console j’s observed characteristics by a vector x
j
. Utility from these observed qualities is, however, realized
only through the presence of software titles: The quality is constrained by the console technology, x
j
, for
some games but not others. Thus the vector of coeﬃcients, β
x
, would change over time with consumers’
perception of the game quality. Since the quality of game software is not observable, x
j
β
x
captures the
average beneﬁt from the console technology, and the deviation from the average is captured by an error, ξ
jt
,
where E
(
ξ
jt
)
= 0. The unobserved error also reﬂects important factors that lead consumers to purchase
a particular console that are not present in the data. A process of building console image, perhaps partly
stimulated by advertising, may be one example of such a factor. In an eﬀort to control for the time-varying
consumer tastes, we include console dummies and allow for them to change over time. Note that console
dummy variables substitute for the use of x
j
β
x
because x
j
does not change within a console. Section 5
explains the estimation method in detail.
The indirect network eﬀect is captured by h (N
gt
). We use a Box-Cox transformation for the number of
game titles, h (N
gt
) =
(
N
λ
gt
− 1
)
/λ, where λ is to be estimated. This transformation allows for linear (when
λ = 1) and logarithmic (when λ = 0) speciﬁcations. We estimate only an indirect network eﬀect, not a direct
eﬀect. There would be a direct network eﬀect in the video game market if consumer utility, and thus console
demand, depended on the number of consumers who own the same console. This would be the case if, for
example, console users derived value from borrowing games from other users of the same console. Such an
eﬀect may be present in a local region, but with the country-level data at hand, we believe the indirect eﬀect
to be of far more signiﬁcance.
We impose assumptions on ε
jt
that generates the following standard nested logit model: On the ﬁrst
node, a TV household that does not have a game system decides whether or not to purchase a game console.
If the household decides to buy, it makes a console choice on the second node. Following Berry (1994), a
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linear regression model for this two-stage logit is derived as follows:
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ln (s
jt
)− ln (s
0t
) = β
0
+ x
j
β
x
+ β
p
p
jt
+ ωh (N
gt
) + σ ln
(
s
j|B
t
=1
)
+ ξ
jt
(2)
≡ δ
jt
+ σ ln
(
s
jt|B
t
=1
)
+ ωh (N
gt
) ,
where s
jt
is the share of the hardware market captured by console j ∈ J
t
during period t, and s
jt|B
t
=1
is
the console j’s market share given that consumers decide to purchase video games at period t (i.e., B
t
takes
1 when purchase is made); thus s
jt|B
t
=1
equals s
jt
/ (1− s
0t
), where s
0t
is the market share of the outside
option at time t (Thus, s
0
+
∑
s
j
= 1). The mean utility of the outside option is assumed to be zero.
Otherwise it should be incorporated in the constant term of the demand equation. This assumption is the
standard treatment in the literature, and does not aﬀect the estimates of own- and cross-price elasticities.
We estimate the above model in Section 5. We turn now to the estimation model of software entry.
3.2 Software entry
We describe the determination of variety in game titles. When more consumers buy a particular console,
software ﬁrms have more incentive to produce games designed for that console. We assume that there
are many software ﬁrms that can potentially produce game titles for any particular console. According to
Coughlan (2001), software ﬁrms normally publish more than one game title for a particular console. For
example, Electronic Arts, the largest software publisher, published nearly 6.3 percent of the overall game
titles during our sample period. To simplify the estimation model, however, we assume a single-product
software ﬁrm provides its game title to a console j ∈ J
t
, where J
t
is the number of consoles available at
t. Software production exhibits increasing returns to scale and free entry. Those consumers who purchase
game titles already own a console. The market size for the software is thus the size of the installed base,
IB
gt
. We use the index g to account for the backward compatibility of the PS2, already mentioned in the
previous section. Each consumer in the installed base of console j has a CES demand for software s. Under
the above assumptions, the symmetric Bertrand equilibrium determines the degree of available variety in
game titles as:
N
jt
= A
j
· (IB
gt
)
γ
.
Church and Gandal (1992; 1993), Chou and Shy (1990), and Nair et al (2004) use the same assumptions
on the software market listed above to derive the equilibrium degree of software variety. The derivation is
10
The derivation is available in the unpublished appendix.
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also available in our unpublished appendix. We thus use the following reduced-form empirical model:
ln (N
jt
) = α
j
+ γ ln (IB
gt
) + η
jt
, (3)
where η
jt
is a mean-zero error. The model includes a console ﬁxed eﬀect, α
j
. We adopt the usual deﬁnition
of the installed base, in that IB
gt
, is the cumulative sum of console sales up to the time t − 1. Thus, by
deﬁnition, the size of the installed base never declines throughout the console lifetime. Other factors being
equal, an older console is usually less attractive for game providers to supply titles, since such a console
embodies older technology. Thus, the sensitivity of the installed base to the variety in titles, represented by
γ, may be diﬀerent for an old console as opposed to a new one. In order to consider this vintage eﬀect, we
include the hardware-age variable directly in equation (3), and allow it to interact with the installed base
variable. This age variable counts the number of years after the console release. Accounting for the vintage
eﬀect is important in our analysis, because the data cover the initial as well as ﬁnal stages of lifecycle for
some consoles.
The rest of the paper analyzes the two equations (2) and (3). As is common with models of network
eﬀects, our model has multiple equilibria, and we discuss this issue in the appendix. This paper essentially
assumes that the data and estimation result correspond to the stable equilibrium.
Before we turn to the estimation method, it is useful to discuss how the model presented above identiﬁes
elasticities in the market. We address two issues, hardware supply and dynamics. To estimate the price and
variety elasticities of hardware adoption, it is more eﬃcient to jointly estimate hardware demand in addition
to supply equation by using cross-equation restrictions imposed by an imperfect-competition model. If the
supply equation is misspeciﬁed, however, the resulting estimates would not be eﬃcient, but even worse, not
consistent. Under dramatic changes in the market with uncertain product life and lack of appropriate cost
proxies, it is diﬃcult to specify a hardware supply model for video game consoles. Since we are interested
in obtaining consistent estimates of the demand model, this paper estimates only the hardware adoption
equation.
The model presented in this section is a static model. Since a video game console is durable, it may
be more appropriate to use a dynamic model to describe the market. The major issue of dynamics in the
video game market concerns the timing of both hardware adoption and software entry. In the hardware
market, consumers decide to purchase a console based on their expectations of the future popularity of the
console. We can think of two types of console buyers: (i) those who did not purchase a video game before;
and (ii) those who own older game systems. At each point in time, the ﬁrst consumer type compares the
net beneﬁt of purchasing a game system to the value of outside option, and the second type compares it to
the net beneﬁt of sticking with the older system. While the dimensionality of the problem makes it very
diﬃcult to model dynamic behavior that fully accounts for this trade-oﬀ, we try to capture it in the empirical
10
implementation. We include console-time interaction dummies that proxy for console-speciﬁc events aﬀecting
expectations. To account for the type (ii) consumers, we allow for the installed base to depreciate, so that
the outside market share changes with the ﬂow of returning consumers. Although we cannot uncover the
underlying decision-making process in the choice of purchase timing, we believe that our reduced-form static
treatment still gives us consistent estimates of hardware adoption process.
Timing of product launch in the software market is another issue. Forward-looking software publishers
base their entry decisions on expectations about future growth of console sales. For example, if uncertainty
exists as to the future proﬁtability of a console, a publisher may wait before introducing its software com-
patible with the console, or may wish to supply another console. Although modeling the product launch
decision is beyond the scope of the paper, we try to capture this feature by including console dummies that
proxy for diﬀerences in proﬁtability across console types that inﬂuence expectations, and also by including
console age interacted with installed base to capture publishers’ anticipation of the console market size at
a given point of the console lifecycle. While we believe that estimation results based on (3) still hold in a
dynamic setting, we need to interpret the results with caution.
4 Data and Estimation
4.1 Data
Our data on console sales and the number of available game titles come from the NPD Group, a market
research ﬁrm. NPD Group collects data from approximately two dozen of the largest game retailers in the
United States. These retailers account for approximately 65% of the U.S. market; from this data, NPD
formulates estimates of ﬁgures for the entire U.S. market. These estimates do not take into account sales to
rental outlets such as Blockbuster.
We have monthly data for the period from January 1994 to March 2002. We excluded the two latest
consoles, the Nintendo Game Cube and the Microsoft Xbox, due to small sample sizes (both of these consoles
were introduced late in 2001). It is important to use monthly rather than annual data because of the short
life cycle of hardware, and the even shorter life cycle of software titles (an individual title has positive sales
for approximately 30 months, on average).
For game consoles, we have retail revenues and retail quantities sold, broken down by console. We
calculated the average retail price of a console from the data of revenues and quantities. We use the consumer
price index (all urban consumers: all items less food and energy) to adjust the nominal resale price. The
data on technical characteristics of the various consoles, noted in Section 2, were collected from console
manufacturers’ websites.
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For game titles, we know when an individual title receives sales, broken down
11
See www.nintendo.com, www.playstation.com, and www.sega.com.
11
by console. In addition, game titles are categorized by publisher (the ﬁrm that markets the title; publishers
may develop games themselves or contract with independent game developers).
We deﬁne the potential video game market as the number of people who had a TV but did not have a
video game system prior to their purchase. The number of U.S. households with at least one television set
in the study period comes from the Census Bureau’s 2003 Statistical Abstract of the United States. The
size of the installed base by console and by month is obtained by the cumulative console sales up to the
previous month. The installed base at the beginning of 1994 is obtained from Bayus and Shankar (2003,
Table 1), which reports the installed base of NES (25.7), SNES (4.8), and Genesis (7.6) in 1994. The number
in a parenthesis is in million units. Although the numbers are somewhat inconsistent with those reported
in Brandenburger (1995b) for SNES (8.5) and Genesis (10.6), we use the data from the former. Use of
the Brandenburger (1995b) data does not eﬀectively change the results reported in the subsequent sections.
Demand for upgrading (i.e., switching from old to new consoles) may be a concern due to rapid quality
improvement. It is, however, impossible to read the magnitude of upgrading demand from the dataset. To
check the signiﬁcance of our concern on the presence of upgrading demand, Section 5 introduces depreciation
in the console installed base.
4.2 Instruments
This subsection addresses identiﬁcation issues in the base estimation model of hardware adoption and soft-
ware entry. The estimation models are:
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The variables are deﬁned in Section 3. We ﬁrst discuss the estimation of (2) and then turn to the estimation
of (4).
Hardware adoption Much of the previous literature makes the identifying assumption that x
j
and ξ
jt
are not correlated with one another. Although it helps greatly by reducing the number of instruments needed
in the estimation, this assumption may not be accurate in that observed characteristics could be positively
correlated with brand image or other attributes for which we do not have data. Because of this concern,
we use console dummy variables to control for unobserved attributes. Section 3.1 discusses the possibility
that brand images and consumers’ perception of observed quality could change over time. To account for
this concern, we include diﬀerent console dummies by year, along with year ﬁxed eﬀects in the estimation.
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Although our data are of monthly frequency as described in Section 4.1, we could not obtain meaningful
estimates by including monthly dummies due to the lack of cross-sectional variation with only a few consoles
in the market.
Even after controlling for brand and time dummies, the deviation from the mean in some variables may
still be correlated with the mean-deviation of ξ
jt
. We are concerned that three variables are correlated with
console j’s error, ξ
jt
: they are within-group share, price and software variety. An obvious variable that
is plausibly correlated with ξ
jt
is ln
(
s
jt|B
t
=1
)
, since s
jt|B
t
=1
contains part of the dependent variable, s
jt
.
Console prices, p
jt
, may be endogenous, because if ξ
jt
is correctly perceived by consumers and suppliers in
the market, a console with a better image may induce higher willingness to pay, and thus sellers may be able
to charge higher prices in an oligopolistic market. The last endogenous variable in the hardware adoption
is the variety in game titles, N
gt
. This concern comes from the interaction with the software entry model
(4), and the autocorrelation on ξ
jt
. An increase in console demand at t − 1, because of the change in the
unobserved error, would inﬂate the installed base at t, leading to an expansion of the variety. Thus ξ
jt
and
N
gt
are positively correlated with each other in the presence of the autocorrelation in ξ
jt
.
In order to control for the endogeneity in console price, we employ two kinds of instruments from the cost
side. The two instruments are constructed by using the fact that all the consoles in the data were imported
from Japan. One instrument is monthly exchange rates between the Japanese Yen and the U.S. dollar (the
data are from International Financial Statistics, 2002). Since most of the manufacturing processes occurred
in Japan during the period, the U.S. retail price of a console should have been aﬀected by exchange rates
between Japan and the United States. We use a lag of one year for the exchange rate, because the console
introduction date in the U.S. was usually one year behind that of Japan. Note, however, that this instrument
is an industry aggregate, and does not vary by console type. The use of this instrument thus only helps
identify the hardware demand through the variations of the instrument over time.
The other cost-side instrument is the console retail price in Japan. The data are from various semi-
weekly issues of the Famicon bulletin (in the period from January 1992 to December 1998) and from Nikkei
Newspaper (from June 1996 to March 2001). We cross-checked the overlapped period to ﬁnd that the price
levels are similar across the two sources. We again take a lag of one year for the console prices in Japan, in
view of the diﬀerence in the release dates between Japan and the United States. Since almost all consoles in
the data were manufactured and sold in Japan, the Japanese console price would contain cost shocks, as well
as eﬀects of consumers’ tastes for unobserved quality in Japan. Thus, if Japanese gamers’ tastes diﬀer from
American tastes, the Japanese console retail prices serve as a cost-side instrument for retail prices in the U.S.
market. Some evidence suggests that such a diﬀerence in tastes does exist.
12
The identifying assumption
made here is reminiscent to that made in Hausman (1996) in his study of the ready-to-eat cereal industry.
The identiﬁcation condition is that all demand shocks are uncorrelated across cities in the country. While
12
“New Riddle for Xbox: Will it Play in Japan?” New York Times, February 18, 2002.
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some papers (for example, Bresnahan, 1996) criticize this identifying assumption because of the importance
of national advertising and fads for some products, our assumption of uncorrelated demand shocks across
countries may be more reasonable, especially for the countries where cultural traits are very diﬀerent.
Because of our unique data source detailed in Section 4.1, we have instruments available from software
side: the monthly average age of software titles provided to a console. Popular titles tend to stay in the
market longer and attract more consumers to the associated console. Thus we expect that a console with
more older-game titles achieve a larger within market share, ln
(
s
jt|B
t
=1
)
. Note that the monthly average
age of software titles does not simply represent a time trend by console, due to signiﬁcant entry and exit
of game titles. We also use console age as an instrument. This instrument is measured by the number of
months that passed since the console introduction. The squared and interaction terms of the instruments
mentioned above are also used.
Software entry Our concern here is endogeneity of the installed base in (4). If software entry associated
with console j is accelerated due to η
jt−1
, an unobserved shock in the software market at t− 1, this shock
would induce new console adoption and boost the share of the console, s
jt−1
, and hence the installed base
in the next period, IB
gt
. Thus if η
jt
is autocorrelated with η
jt−1
, endogeneity in IB
gt
arises. We use
as an instrument the monthly average age of software titles provided to a console, the same instrument
used in hardware adoption. We can think of cases where the average software age correlates with the entry
error. If potential entrants perceive the presence of many older titles as a sign of a proﬁtable opportunity,
the instrument would be positively correlated with η
jt
. On the other hand, if they see it as a result of
tough competition (i.e., that young titles cannot survive in a market), the instrument would be negatively
correlated with the error. Thus the direction of the bias by use of this instrument, if it exists, could go
either way. We thus rely on the statistical test of overidentifying restrictions to check if the instruments are
orthogonal to the error. Section 5 reports that the test would not reject the orthogonality condition. We
also include in the set of instruments console age, squared console age, and the interaction of hardware and
software ages.
5 Estimation results
This section presents estimation results of the hardware adoption and software entry equations discussed in
the previous section. We ﬁrst estimate the equations independently using a two-stage least squared (2SLS)
method, and then estimate them jointly. Important statistics in the hardware market are presented in Table
1, and deﬁnitions of variables and summary statistics are in Table 4.
It is known that the 2SLS method can produce severe inconsistency, if the instruments are weak. We
thus check the explanatory power of instruments, conditional on the included exogenous variables in the
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ﬁrst stage of the 2SLS method. We obtain a F-statistic for each of the endogenous variables discussed in
Section 4.2. To conserve space, Table 2 reports the average value of the F-statistics. We ﬁnd, however, that
all the instruments used in this paper are not weak at the 95-percent conﬁdence level of F statistics. The
estimated coeﬃcients in the table are obtained by regressing the dependent variable onto the exogenous and
ﬁtted values of endogenous variables.
Hardware adoption Table 2 shows three estimation results from hardware equation. The ﬁrst speciﬁ-
cation (H1) controls only for time and console eﬀects, and does not include the interaction of the two. We
use the instruments introduced in Section 4.2 to control for endogeneity in console price, software variety,
and within-group market share. Since we have more instruments than we need to identify an equation, we
can test whether the additional instruments are uncorrelated with the error by using the J-statistic (i.e.,
the statistic for overidentifying restrictions). We ﬁnd that the model (H1) does not ﬁt well: Although the
average F-statistics indicate that the instruments are not weak, the J-statistic rejects the hypothesis that the
instruments are orthogonal to the error. In order to check for the presence of autocorrelated errors and the
resulting endogeneity problem for software variety addressed in Section 3.2, we supplement the estimation
with a test on whether the residuals are autocorrelated. We construct the AR(1) coeﬃcient in the table
by ﬁrst estimating a coeﬃcient of the lagged residual for each console, and then aggregating them by using
console market share as a weight. The aggregated coeﬃcient is found to be at modest level at 0.45, indicating
a need to control for software variety.
13
The estimated coeﬃcients on price and the network eﬀect are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The parameter in the Box-Cox transformation, λ, is estimated at 0.99,
rejecting the hypothesis of a logarithm speciﬁcation on N
gt
.
One possible explanation of the insuﬃcient ﬁt in (H1) is that the present model does not account for
the dynamic nature of the industry: Consumers’ attention to game consoles was presumably stimulated over
time by the introduction of new game titles. It is thus unrealistic to think that consumers’ perception of
console quality (both observed and unobserved), represented by console dummies, is constant across time.
An ideal estimation should rather allow for consumers’ preference over consoles to evolve with time. To
respond to this concern, we include diﬀerent console dummies by year.
14
The underlying assumption here is
that unobserved console attributes diﬀer by year, and the derivation from the time-varying console dummies
are obtained as a regression error. For all the speciﬁcations with the console-year interaction dummies, the
parameter in the Box-Cox transformation is not estimated precisely, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that
λ = 1. We therefore use a linear form in the software variety for the remaining hardware speciﬁcations.
15
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Taking a simple average in the aggregation of the AR(1) coeﬃcients does not change this result much.
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We include the console-year interaction dummies when the console received more than one million units of sales for the
year. This method makes 27 interaction dummies.
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The estimation result on λ does not preclude a logarithmic speciﬁcation on software variety in these models; however, the
linear speciﬁcation ﬁts better than the logarithmic speciﬁcation. We also experimented with a power function of N . Again we
found the linear speciﬁcation to have a better ﬁt to the data.
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The estimation result is under (H2). The J-statistic reports that the model now ﬁts far better than the
previous model. The value of autocorrelation coeﬃcient does not change much from that reported in (H1),
and thus we continue to treat software variety as an endogenous variable. Table 3 shows the yearly demand
elasticity with respect to price by console (E
p
in the ﬁrst row for each console), and its standard error.
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The elasticity is estimated at -1.07 on average.
17
Though the elasticity values diﬀer substantially across
consoles, Table 3 documents that the console demand becomes less price elastic with the age of console. The
elasticity in the ﬁrst year of introduction was on average estimated at -1.92, and it increased with console
age until the value reaches -0.52 when the console had been in the market for seven years.
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Table 3 also shows the elasticity of demand with respect to software variety (E
s
in the third row for each
console), and its standard error.
19
While the demand is found to be elastic at 1.89 on average, the elasticity
values vary a lot across the consoles, from a high point of 5.51 for PS2 down to 0.75 for Saturn.
In a market with strong indirect network eﬀects, it is crucial to make sure that a new game system
is widely adopted. Two ways a platform provider can do this are lowering the price of hardware and
encouraging software entry. One interesting question is to measure the relative eﬀectiveness of these two
strategies. Following the idea of Gandal, Kende and Rob (2000), we calculate a ratio of E
p
and E
s
. This
ratio measures the eﬀect of console price equivalent to a one-percent increase in software variety (in absolute
value). The result is in Table 3 (under −E
s
/E
p
). The ratios suggest that, as far as consumers are concerned,
a 1% increase in game titles is equivalent to a 2.3% of price cut in game titles in the market, aggregating
across years and consoles. In general, the ratio starts low with the introduction of a new console, increases
to as large as 2.80 (for PS and Genesis), and eventually declines as the console retires from the market.
Section 4.2 discusses that, without regard for the endogeneity, both the price, variety, and within-group
share coeﬃcients would be biased upward. In order to check the severity of the endogeneity concern, we
estimate the model (H2) with the assumption that the explanatory variables are exogenous. The result with
the exogenous variables is under (H3). The comparison with the result in (H2) points to the elimination
of the endogeneity biases, although the diﬀerences of the OLS and 2SLS estimates of price and variety
coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero . The OLS estimate on price (-0.50) is 30% higher than
the 2SLS estimate (-0.71), but the 2SLS yields an estimate on software variety close to the corresponding
OLS estimate (0.43). We use the result in (H2) as the base estimate for hardware adoption in the subsequent
sections.
Lastly we estimate the model under the assumption that the console installed base depreciates at an
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using a delta method. The mathematical derivations are available upon request.
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The yearly elasticity (for both price and software variety) is calculated as follows: we ﬁrst obtain elasticities by console and
by month, and then aggregate them by taking a simple average.
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Only four consoles survived for seven years within the sample period: PS, Genesis, Saturn and SNES.
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a delta method. The mathematical derivations are available upon request.
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annual rate of 5 percent (The next subsection details how we incorporate the depreciation). This assumptions
allows those consumers who own older consoles to purchase another game systems. The outside market share
thus changes with the ﬂow of returning consumers. The estimation result is very close to those of (H2),
indicating that the results in (H2) are robust to the size of outside market share (The results are available
in the unpublished appendix).
Software entry We now turn to results of estimating the software entry model, (4). The estimation
results are under (S1) - (S4). The speciﬁcation (S1) leaves out the hardware-age variable from (4), by
assuming that γ
2
= γ
3
= 0. Although the installed base coeﬃcient is found signiﬁcantly positive, the
model (S1) does not ﬁt well, and we could reject the hypothesis that the instruments are orthogonal to the
error. One possible reason for this insuﬃcient ﬁt is that game providers, when supplying titles, may respond
diﬀerently by the vintage of consoles. The speciﬁcation (S2) thus include hardware age as an explanatory
variable. The J-statistic shows that the model now ﬁts moderately well with the instruments. The high and
signiﬁcant average autocorrelation coeﬃcient in η (0.92) indicates the need to use instruments for installed
base. Comparison with the OLS result in (S3) shows that the instruments successfully control for the bias
in the installed base coeﬃcient, from 1.47 (OLS) to 2.94 (2SLS). The direction of bias in the coeﬃcient is
diﬃcult to predict, because we also include hardware age variable in the estimation: Hardware age traces a
trend of installed base, and the two variables are correlated at the level of 0.77. The F-statistic indicates
that the instruments are not weak. Holding the hardware age being constant at the mean (3.6 years), a
1% increase in the installed base expands the software variety on average by 4.52%. The result also shows
that, holding the installed base size at the mean value, an older console would be less attractive for software
providers to launch game titles: Console with additional one year in the market would lose 2.6 percent of
software titles. Table 3 indicates that the elasticities of software variety with respect to the installed base
(under Entry Elasticity wrt IB) are estimated to be 5.05 on average. Based on the estimation results in
Tables 2 and 3, we discuss implications of network eﬀects in the U.S. video game market in the next section.
The last software speciﬁcation (S4) employs a diﬀerent set of the installed base to test the robustness
of the base result. The speciﬁcation (S2) assumes that the installed base size equals the sum of past sales
(IB
gt
=
∑
s=t−1
s=t0
q
gs
, where q
gs
is the sales of format g at time t, where t0 is the console introduction
date). Under (S4), we consider that the installed base depreciates at an annual rate of 5 percent (that
is, the deﬁnition of the installed base of format g becomes
∑
s=t−1
s=t0
δ
(s−t0)
q
gs
, where δ is a depreciation
rate).
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The coeﬃcients of installed base and its interaction with hardware age are smaller than those of
(S2). Nevertheless, the main results in Section 6 qualitatively hold with this speciﬁcation.
20
Since the data are of monthly frequency, we set δ as 0.9957 (= exp (log (0.95)/12)).
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Joint Estimation The speciﬁcation (J) in Table 2 reports the joint estimation results from (2) and (4).
Although we do not have cross-equation restrictions, the joint estimation produces more eﬃcient estimates,
when the errors from the hardware and software equations are correlated. We calculate the generalized
method of moment (GMM) estimators, with an optimal weighting matrix being constructed by the 2SLS
residuals from the speciﬁcations (H2) and (S2). We ﬁnd that the obtained estimates are almost the same as
those in (H2) and (S2), but their standard errors are somewhat reduced for the hardware equation, and does
not change much for the software. Nevertheless, the values of standard errors calculated by the estimates in
(J) are similar to those in Table 3 we discussed in the previous sections.
6 Implications of the indirect network eﬀect
This section describes how the indirect network eﬀect identiﬁed in the previous section plays a role in video
game system competition in the period from 1994 to 2002. To analyze the relative strength of each console,
we take a deviation in (2) and (4) from the averages to obtain the following equations:
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where g = j except that, for PS2, g is the sum of PS and PS2 because of the backward compatibility. We
deﬁne k (IB
gt
, h_age) in (4), and ∆y
jt
≡ y
jt
−y
t
, where an upper bar on a variable indicates the average of
the variable across consoles available in the market in a given time t. The deviation in the console market
shares and software provision can be decomposed into the network eﬀect (the ﬁrst term) and the non-network
eﬀect (the second term). We use the estimates under (J) presented in Table 2 to explore the importance of
the network eﬀect in explaining the market outcomes, relative to the industry average (i.e., the left hand
side of the equations).
We ﬁrst discuss implications from console adoption (5). Figure 2 presents the relationship between the
relative market shares and the diﬀerence in network eﬀect for ﬁve selected consoles.
21
The ﬁgure illustrates
that PS performed better than the average in console sales (i.e., the deviation in the market share is above
zero), while the eﬀect of software variety is stronger than the average only in 1997 and afterwards. On
the other hand, Saturn’s performance was always below the average. The ﬁgure conﬁrms that the software
variety predicts well the changes in the relative strength of console market share: When more game titles
enter the console market relative to the industry average, the consoles sell better than the average.
In Figure 2, besides a fairly strong positive correlation, we also see a generally clockwise pattern in the
21
A ﬁgure for the other consoles is available from the authors.
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change of deviation of market share (i.e., ∆ ln (s
jt
)) versus deviation of software variety (i.e., ω∆N
gt
). Since
ω is positive, the observation of clockwise pattern was not aﬀected by the estimation results obtained in
the previous section. Consider the data points for the Sega Saturn for 1997 and 1998. From 1997 to 1998,
the market share deviation dropped, but the software variety deviation did not change much. That is, the
relative market share dropped, and this was followed by a drop in the relative amount of software variety.
We take this to be an indication of inertia in the software market. Even after the growth of the installed
base has slowed down, software publishers continue to develop new titles in order to reap proﬁts from the
established installed base. At some point, however, new software development tapers oﬀ, causing a further
decrease in relative market share (i.e., a decline in the growth rate of the installed base). In the declining
stage of the product cycle, market shares are more sensitive to the network eﬀect than in the growth stage.
22
Figure 3 presents the deviation in the installed base from the average (i.e., [k (IB
gt
, h_age
jt
)]γ) versus
the deviation in software variety (i.e., ∆ ln (N
jt
)). Since hardware age essentially traces a trend of the size of
installed base (and the correlation coeﬃcient between the two variables is 0.77), it is diﬃcult to separate the
two variables and discuss the impact of the installed base. We thus take the ﬁrst three explanatory variables
in (4) as k (IB
gt
, h_age), and construct the installed base index in Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows a positive correlation between the two. In contrast to Figure 2, however, the trajectory
for each console is generally counterclockwise. This trajectory pattern does not depend on the values of
γ.
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Again considering the data points for the Saturn from 1997 to 1998, the deviation in the installed base
changes signiﬁcantly but the deviation in software variety does not. As a console ages, superior technology
emerges, and growth in the installed base of the technologically inferior platform begins to decline. The
relative number of software titles also declines, but only after a lag. Looking at the trajectories for diﬀerent
consoles, we see diﬀerent rates at which the deviation in software titles declines relative to the deviation in
installed base; but diﬀerent consoles tend to follow the same counterclockwise pattern.
The elasticity results from the previous section further illustrate the U.S. video game market during
our study period. As discussed in Section 2, platform providers proﬁt primarily through software royalties.
They can only do this if they establish both sides of the software market: i.e., establish an installed base of
customers, which then induces software entry and provides the ultimate source from which royalties will be
drawn. Once the feedback process is under way, the consumer base and software variety build upon each
other. To get the process started, however, it is particularly eﬀective for a hardware producer to attract
consumers through price. The price elasticity of demand for hardware by vintage points to the eﬀectiveness
of penetration pricing. In fact, as we describe in Section 2, console providers priced aggressively in the ﬁrst
few years of console introduction: Figure 2 illustrates that the price cut was on average 28% annually in the
ﬁrst three years of console introduction, while the price drop became more modest at 7.45% when console is
22
An exception is a small increase in the market share for the Sega Genesis in 1999. This is probably due to the consumer
response to a large price cut. Sega cut the price of the Genesis by more than half in 1999 (see Table 1).
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The feature in Figure 3 still holds when we replace ∆g (IB
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) γ with γ
1
∆IB
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.
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in the market for four years or longer. The price elasticity declines throughout the product cycle, indicating
that price cutting is less eﬀective as a console ages (Although we observe hardware prices declining over time,
costs are certainly declining. Penetration pricing is thus most reasonably interpreted as an increasing price-
cost margin. Holding the degree of competition ﬁxed in the hardware market, an decrease in price elasticity
implies an increasing price-cost margin.
24
It is likely that console producers have followed a strategy of
penetration pricing in this sense).
On the other hand, the elasticity of demand for hardware with respect to software variety is relatively
low at the beginning of the product cycle, increases to a peak in the middle of the cycle, and then declines.
This suggests that, while a low price is necessary to start the adoption process, software variety is necessary
to continue adoption of the console. It is not obvious why the elasticity with respect to software variety
is low at the beginning of the product cycle. The industry wisdom seems to be that software provision is
crucial for the establishment of a console. This is a primary reason why hardware ﬁrms develop their own
game titles: They want to ensure the supply of enough high-quality games to start the adoption process.
However, our elasticity results indicate that an additional software title has little eﬀect on software adoption
early in the cycle. We could speculate that it is necessary to have a set of games to draw early adopters, but
that there is little marginal impact beyond this critical level.
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Later in the product cycle, as the console
becomes more mainstream, the variety of software expands greatly, and the impact of each additional title
is greater than before. Considering the incentives of a hardware producer, the best strategy in the middle
of the product cycle is to encourage software entry directly, perhaps by lowering royalties or relaxing other
restrictions on the acceptance of new titles.
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Near the end of the cycle, when a platform is in decline, additional software has less eﬀect on demand.
This could be due to the fact that by then there is already a large set of software associated with the platform,
so each additional title is not worth as much to consumers. At this point, the network eﬀect becomes less
important: Increases in software variety have less of an eﬀect on hardware demand. Because of competition
from newer consoles, there are not many new adopters. It is in the interest of the platform provider to
capture as much surplus as possible from the established installed base.
We have examined a market in which indirect network eﬀects are crucial to the persistence of a technology:
Without game software, video game hardware is useless. Other notable markets have this same characteristic:
PCs and software, CD players and CDs, DVD players and DVDs, and probably more to come in the future.
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The degree of competition, measured by the annual Herﬁndale index from 1994 to 2002 is calculated as 0.47, 0.34, 0.22,
0.40, 0.48, 0.29, 0.28, and 0.38 (the values are divided by 10,000). This magnitude of changes in the index is swamped by the
magnitude of those in the price elasticity. Although this inference is based on the homogenous Cournot competition, it is hard
to believe, from our reading trade press, that the hardware market became concentrated by a similar magnitude of the elasticity
changes during the study period.
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To get an idea of what this critical level is, we would need to compare adoption patterns of successful and unsuccessful
consoles; i.e. consoles that never quite caught on give us an indication of how much software provision is necessary to launch a
console.
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This point perhaps explains why 3DO did not succeed in the market: 3DO expended much of their attention to providing
game titles in the early stage of product cycle, rather than to penetrating the console market.
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It would be reasonable to guess that the product cycle is similar in all of these markets, and thus that the
diﬀusion strategies discussed here would be useful in these markets also.
7 Conclusion
Network eﬀects and positive feedback loops have received a great deal of attention, academically and other-
wise. In a market with network eﬀects, competition among multiple incompatible systems is intense, because
a small, initial advantage confers a larger advantage in the future. Many theoretical papers suggest various
competitive strategies in a market with strong indirect network eﬀects, but little work has been done on
what strategies are most eﬀective in each phase of the product cycle. To tackle this problem, this paper
analyzes two sides of the U.S. video game market, hardware adoption by consumers and software provision
by game makers, and estimates the elasticities of adoption with respect to console price and software variety.
We ﬁnd that the relative size of the elasticities of hardware demand diﬀers over the product cycle: When
a console is introduced, hardware demand is quite elastic with respect to price, but much less elastic with
respect to software variety. As the console becomes mature, the price elasticity declines substantially, but
the elasticity with respect to software variety increases substantially. The estimation results suggest that,
while a suﬃciently large set of software may be necessary to launch a system, a platform provider should use
penetration pricing to encourage adoption at the outset (i.e., a lower price-cost margin). Once the platform
provider succeeds in establishing an installed base, it can expand the installed base, and thus the proﬁtability
of the platform, by encouraging software entry. A wider variety of software is crucial for attracting later
adopters to the platform.
An important direction for future research is to characterize the incentives of platform providers more
precisely. By explicitly incorporating hardware supply into our framework, we can expand upon the inferences
drawn in this paper.
A Comment on Multiple Equilibria
A common implication of models of network eﬀects is the existence of multiple equilibria. Generally, there
is an equilibrium in which no consumers buy hardware and no software ﬁrms enter. This degenerate equi-
librium is eliminated from our model because of the use of logarithm speciﬁcations in (2) and (4). With the
assumption of linear h (N) in (2) (we ﬁnd a better ﬁt with this speciﬁcation; see Section 5), the model has
at most two equilibria; it always has one stable equilibrium, and the other equilibrium, if exists, is unstable.
Substituting N
jt
in (4) with the right-hand side of (2) yields:
ln
(
s
jt
1−
∑
i
s
it
)
= δ
jt
+B · ω
(
t−1
∑
q=1
MS
q
· s
jq
)
γ
, (7)
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where B ≡ exp
(
α
j
+ η
jt
)
and MS
q
is the potential market size for video game consoles at time q. In a
steady state, the left-hand size of (7) is monotonically increasing in s
j
, and the right-hand side is either a U
shape (if γ > 1), or an inverse U shape (if γ < 1) with respect to s
j
. The stable steady-state equilibrium is
where the left-hand side of (7) intersects with the right-hand side from the above. We assume that the data
and estimation results correspond to the stable equilibrium.
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TABLE 1
U.S. Video GameMarket
1994 - 2002 Q1
Platform Types Introduction Platform Main console characteristics
(format) Year Provider CPU bits MHZ RAM (M bytes) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Q1
PlayStation September 1995 Sony 32 33.87 2 % Console units sold 11.15 28.83 49.82 61.38 55.06 39.17 16.89 12.87
(CD-ROM) Mean Console Price (USD) 301.67 235.15 158.03 138.79 117.84 99.59 99.63 109.31
% software variety 1.17 9.31 20.65 32.20 43.54 51.94 53.18 51.61
%variety offerd by platform provider 25.00 19.04 19.48 20.45 20.18 18.20 16.26 15.08
N64 September 1996 Nintendo 64 93.75 4 % Console units sold 24.99 38.69 31.27 28.98 30.59 7.51 1.54
(Cartridge) Mean Console Price (USD) 199.61 159.33 138.06 121.92 105.23 90.09 84.42
% software variety 0.20 1.68 5.62 11.34 15.41 15.12 14.65
%variety offerd by platform provider 80.00 42.11 24.16 17.22 18.99 20.03 20.74
Genesis September 1989 Sega 16 7.60 0.072 % Console units sold 57.87 42.68 18.56 4.12 5.31 3.53 0.67 0.01
(CD-ROM) Mean Console Price (USD) 117.59 113.92 94.13 73.46 46.87 22.84 19.90 19.23
% software variety 42.02 45.86 42.08 34.46 25.52 17.98 10.30 5.55 3.60
%variety offerd by platform provider 28.63 28.89 29.88 32.37 34.94 33.20 26.56 21.19 19.40
PlayStation 2 October 2000 Sony 128 294.91 32 % Console units sold 13.41 47.00 56.38
(DVD-ROM) Mean Console Price (USD) 297.47 304.11 298.33
% software variety 0.69 7.04 12.75
%variety offerd by platform provider 2.22 5.90 8.37
Super Nintendo September 1991 Nintendo 16 3.6 0.128 % Console units sold 36.43 37.71 15.88 5.11 1.61 0.12 0.01 0.0001
Entertainment System Mean Console Price (USD) 115.01 121.19 121.99 94.94 75.47 60.90 52.87 53.40
(Cartridge) % software variety 32.15 37.40 34.96 26.68 20.23 14.04 8.66 5.04 3.33
%variety offerd by platform provider 8.47 8.92 10.36 13.18 16.67 21.03 25.44 24.55 17.46
Dreamcast September 1999 Sega 128 200 16 % Console units sold 12.27 16.14 8.76 0.05
(CD-ROM) Mean Console Price (USD) 198.34 182.79 93.83 50.25
% software variety 1.16 7.39 12.07 13.49
%variety offerd by platform provider 22.06 19.59 20.15 22.09
Saturn May 1995 Sega 32 28 4 % Console units sold 4.93 10.49 2.15 0.44 0.05 0.01 0.000
(CD-ROM) Mean Console Price (USD) 369.58 233.98 172.71 77.86 40.30 31.65 36.14
% software variety 1.18 7.71 14.03 15.50 11.81 5.57 2.01 0.58
%variety offerd by platform provider 43.75 31.45 27.67 30.07 33.57 35.64 28.76 0.00
Nintendo Entertainment January 1986 Nintendo 8 1.8 0.002 % Console units sold 4.75 2.25 0.66 0.07 0.001
System Mean Console Price (USD) 55.57 54.38 49.51 43.08 20.16
(Cartridge) % software variety 25.83 14.40 5.75 2.50 0.94
%variety offerd by platform provider 11.50 14.92 25.60 34.03 35.29
Industry console sales (M units) 5.65 4.61 7.09 11.60 12.41 12.21 8.11 13.16 1.37
Total No. Variety 1234 1436 1480 1518 1494 1514 1678 1945 473
The platforms are in order of the total units sales in the period of 1994-2002. The eight platforms covered 99.4 % of the U.S. home video game market. The data of 2002 are up to the first quarter.
% Console units sold is the console market share in the industry at a given year. Thus one can obtain console sales units by multiplying % console units sole by Industry console sales.
% software variety is the share in the total number of softwrare titles available in the market at a given year. The number of software titles for a console is obtained by multiplying %software
variety by Total No. variety listed at the bottom.
TABLE 2
Estimation Results on
Hardware Adotpion (2) and Software Entry (4)
Variables Est. Std. Est. Std. Est. Std. Est. Std. Est. Std. Est. Std. Est. Std. Est. Std.
Hardware:
Constant -13.26 ** 0.40 -16.40 ** 1.87 -16.37 ** 0.96 -16.40 ** 1.56
Price -0.05 0.14 -0.71 ** 0.25 -0.50 ** 0.15 -0.71 ** 0.22
Number of Game Titles 0.11 0.09 0.41 * 0.17 0.43 ** 0.09 0.41 ** 0.13
Within Group Share 0.79 ** 0.04 0.35 ** 0.09 0.60 ** 0.03 0.35 ** 0.06
λ 0.99 * 0.44
Software:
ln(IB) 2.19 ** 0.10 2.94 ** 0.20 1.47 ** 0.04 2.30 ** 0.12 2.94 ** 0.21
ln(IB)*Hardware Age 0.44 ** 0.12 -0.01 0.01 0.38 ** 0.09 0.44 ** 0.12
Hardware Age -7.58 ** 2.05 -0.24 0.23 -6.40 ** 1.53 -7.58 ** 2.08
Time Dummies
Console Dummies
Console Dummies by Year
No. Observations
R-squared
1st stage F stats
J statistics (D.F.)
AR(1) Coefficient
* Significance at the 95-percent confidence level.
** Significance at the 99-percent confidence level.
The dependent variable for the hardware adoption is the logarithm of console market share minus the logarithm of the outside share. The console  market share is defined as the fraction
of the TV households that do not have game systems by a given time. The hardware equation includes year dummies, console dummies, and interactions of console and year dummies (except for (H1)),
which are not reported here. The instruments for hardware adoption are exchange rate (USD/JY), console prices in Japan (CPI adjusted), hardware age (the months passed since the
console introduction), monthly average software age. The squared and interaction terms of the instruments are also used. The number of game titles are divided by 100 for the presentation
purpose. 
The dependent variable for the software entry is the logarithm of the number of game titles provided to a console. The software equation includes year and console dummies, which
are not reported in this table. The instrument used for software entry are monthly averaged software age, and monthly hardware age. The squared and interaction terms of the two age
variables are also used. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used in the table. The estimates of the dummies not reported here are available in the unpublished appendix.
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TABLE 3
Elasticities of Hardware Adoption (2) and Software Entry (4)
Platforms Demand Elasticities 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Average
with respect to:
PlayStation Price (Ep) -2.92 -2.15 -1.33 -1.06 -0.90 -0.79 -0.83 -0.92 -1.37
      std. error (Ep) 0.60 0.77 0.47 0.37 0.32 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.43
Software variety (Es) 0.17 0.67 1.55 2.25 3.16 4.50 5.86 5.56 2.97
      std. error (Es) 0.75 0.45 0.72 0.97 1.34 1.90 2.47 1.04 1.20
- Es / Ep 0.06 0.31 1.17 2.12 3.51 5.67 7.02 6.02 3.24
Entry Elasticity wrt IB 3.02 3.29 3.72 4.16 4.59 5.03 5.46 5.72 4.37
PlayStation2 Price (Ep) -2.47 -2.21 -1.93 -2.20
      std. error (Ep) 0.44 0.78 0.34 0.52
Software variety (Es) 5.55 5.66 5.31 5.51
      std. error (Es) 2.10 2.43 1.02 1.85
- Es / Ep 2.24 2.57 2.75 2.52
Entry Elasticity wrt IB 3.00 3.25 3.51 3.25
Genesis Price (Ep) -1.01 -1.01 -0.88 -0.72 -0.45 -0.22 -0.18 -0.17 -0.58
      std. error (Ep) 0.36 0.36 0.32 0.26 0.17 0.08 0.07 0.17 0.22
Software variety (Es) 2.43 3.31 3.40 3.03 2.20 1.53 1.03 0.66 2.20
      std. error (Es) 1.04 1.41 1.46 1.30 0.94 0.65 0.44 0.66 0.99
- Es / Ep 2.39 3.28 3.87 4.22 4.83 7.09 5.56 3.77 4.38
Entry Elasticity wrt IB 5.03 5.46 5.90 6.33 6.77 7.21 7.64 8.08 6.55
Saturn Price (Ep) -3.77 -2.32 -1.70 -0.76 -0.39 -0.30 -0.33 -1.37
      std. error (Ep) 1.04 0.85 0.62 0.28 0.14 0.10 0.19 0.46
Software variety (Es) 0.11 0.60 1.24 1.39 1.05 0.55 0.28 0.75
      std. error (Es) 0.84 0.49 0.67 0.64 0.46 0.27 0.60 0.57
- Es / Ep 0.03 0.26 0.73 1.82 2.71 1.85 0.87 1.18
Entry Elasticity wrt IB 3.09 3.43 3.87 4.30 4.74 5.17 5.61 4.32
Dreamcast Price (Ep) -1.75 -1.61 -0.81 -0.45 -1.16
      std. error (Ep) 0.30 0.59 0.30 0.26 0.36
Software variety (Es) 0.19 0.64 1.36 1.56 0.94
      std. error (Es) 0.36 0.41 0.62 0.76 0.54
- Es / Ep 0.11 0.40 1.67 3.45 1.41
Entry Elasticity wrt IB 3.02 3.29 3.72 3.98 3.50
Nintendo Entertainment Price (Ep) -0.59 -0.57 -0.50 -0.43 -0.20 -0.46
System       std. error (Ep) 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.19
Software variety (Es) 1.86 1.19 0.50 0.20 0.08 0.77
      std. error (Es) 0.81 0.54 0.25 0.13 0.43 0.43
- Es / Ep 3.16 2.11 1.00 0.48 0.39 1.43
Entry Elasticity wrt IB 6.62 7.06 7.50 7.93 8.37 7.50
Super Nintendo Price (Ep) -1.08 -1.09 -1.14 -0.92 -0.73 -0.59 -0.49 -0.49 -0.82
Entertainment System       std. error (Ep) 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.34 0.27 0.22 0.18 0.26 0.31
Software variety (Es) 2.03 2.74 2.84 2.35 1.79 1.25 0.87 0.71 1.82
      std. error (Es) 0.90 1.19 1.25 1.04 0.79 0.56 0.40 0.58 0.84
- Es / Ep 1.88 2.52 2.49 2.54 2.43 2.13 1.77 1.45 2.15
Entry Elasticity wrt IB 4.16 4.59 5.03 5.46 5.90 6.33 6.77 7.21 5.68
N64 Price (Ep) -1.74 -1.37 -1.21 -1.04 -0.85 -0.78 -0.76 -1.11
      std. error (Ep) 0.48 0.49 0.44 0.37 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.38
Software variety (Es) 0.02 0.11 0.42 0.94 1.37 1.73 1.67 0.90
      std. error (Es) 0.89 0.16 0.27 0.46 0.61 0.77 0.77 0.56
- Es / Ep 0.01 0.08 0.34 0.90 1.61 2.21 2.21 1.05
Entry Elasticity wrt IB 3.02 3.29 3.72 4.16 4.59 5.03 5.28 4.16
Average Price -0.89 -1.87 -1.46 -1.08 -0.74 -0.81 -0.96 -0.80 -1.02 -1.07
      std. error (Ep) 0.32 0.52 0.50 0.39 0.28 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.29 0.35
Software variety (Es) 2.10 1.50 1.34 1.42 1.35 1.35 2.07 2.32 3.53 1.89
      std. error (Es) 0.92 0.95 0.80 0.67 0.67 0.64 0.88 1.16 0.90 0.84
- Es / Ep 2.48 1.60 1.32 1.54 1.99 2.74 2.73 2.79 3.61 2.31
Entry Elasticity wrt IB 5.27 4.64 4.69 5.10 5.54 5.01 5.07 5.48 4.62 5.05
Note:
The elasticities are calculated based on estimates from (H2) and (S2) in Table 2.
TABLE 4
Definitions and Summary Statistics for the Variables
Descriptions Mean Std. Error Min Max
console sales (quantity units in thousand) by month 148.16 285.35 0.00 2795.16
CPI-deflated console price in the United States (in January 1978 U.S. dollars = 100) 1.01 0.69 0.13 3.84
The number of game titles for a system 320 272 2 1244
Installed base by format (in million households) 12.88 9.26 0.03 35.78
Age of console system (in year) 6.01 4.10 0.08 16.08
CPU / GPU (in bits) 51.6 47.5 8.0 128.0
Clock speed (in MHz) 83.3 101.5 3.6 295.0
RAM (in mega bytes) 14.0 14.5 0.1 36.0
Current nominal exchange rate of $US/Japanese Yen 111.45 11.83 84 145
CPI-deflated console price in Japan (in Yen) 16560 9562 1513.3 42500
Average age of software titles by console system (months) 26.40 20.96 0.67 83.91
Average lifetime of software titles by console system (months) 51.63 16.85 8.41 85.79
Sample means of year dummies Sample means of console dummies
1994 0.07 PS 0.16
1995 0.10 PS2 0.03
1996 0.13 Genesis 0.19
1997 0.15 Saturn 0.14
1998 0.13 DreamCast 0.06
1999 0.13 NES 0.11
2000 0.15 SNES 0.17
2001 0.13 N64 0.13
2002 0.02
Sample size: 1055
FIGURE 1
Rivalry in the Major Five U.S. Video Game Systems,
1994-2002
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FIGURE 2
Network Effects in the Hardware Market (5)
Selected Consoles
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FIGURE 3
 Indirect Network Effects in the Software Market (6)
for Selected Consoles
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